To say that British attitudes to Europe have been
exceedingly ambivalent is almost to understate the case. A profound hope that
Europe would succeed and that continental Europe would unify were mixed with
scepticism that historic divisions could be surmounted and cynicism that
political morality could be sustained. Yet the economic success of the EEC
galvanised underperforming Britain to apply for membership, achieved in 1973
after two French vetoes. Relations with Europe have often been fractious and
the impetus towards EU centralisation has hit many sensitive nerves; the
introduction of the Euro, which Britain declined to join, has added a layer of
complication.
It is natural that we should examine our origins in Europe
and learn lessons from our erstwhile leaders. Winston Churchill, in a memorable
and moving speech in Zurich in 1946, proposed the Council of Europe, actually
formed in 1949, as a prelude to the move towards “a kind of United States of
Europe” and encouraged reconciliation between France and Germany.
Churchill advocates European unity |
It never occurred to Churchill that Britain herself should
join in this enterprise. Britain had her large Commonwealth and an intense
national post-war pride; he viewed Britain as a great power acting in
cooperation with the USA and the USSR. He was personally sponsoring (while in
opposition) the recovery of prostrate Europe, mobilising his unique prestige,
to inject some new vision into France and Germany, ruined and humiliated by
their wartime activities. Back in office in 1951, the conservatives maintained
a friendly but remote relationship with Europe, sending only a low-level
delegation as observers to the crucial Messina conference in 1955 which led to
the 1957 Treaty of Rome, creating the 6-nation Common Market. Anthony Eden was
very doubtful about its future success while Labour’s Clem Attlee was gruffly
dismissive. Know them all well. Very
recently this country spent a great deal of blood & treasure rescuing four
of ’em from attacks by the other two…..!
Britain’s faltering economic performance in the 1950s and
1960s, the Suez debacle and the disintegration of the solidarity of the
Commonwealth, convinced Harold Macmillan and officialdom that the only solution
was for Britain to apply for membership of the EEC. He was frustrated by a de
Gaulle veto in 1963, repeated to the Harold Wilson ministry in 1967. De Gaulle
was partly animated by a dislike of “Anglo-Saxon” influences, but he was
acutely aware of how different Britain was from continental Europe. His
analysis rings true today:
England
in effect is insular, she is maritime, she is linked through her exchanges, her
markets, her supply lines to the most diverse and often the most distant
countries; she pursues essentially industrial and commercial activities, and
only slight agricultural ones. She has in all her doings very marked and very
original habits and traditions.
MacMillan
was an unusually radical Tory (more accurately a Whig) and although he failed
in Europe, his lieutenant and eventual successor Edward Heath completed
successful accession negotiations in 1973, once de Gaulle gave way to Pompidou.
Heath was a moderniser and a managerial type who saw the Treaty as essentially a
trade agreement; he had no time for historic legacy (expressed by dissenters
like Enoch Powell) and he dismissed as airy rhetoric the preamble to the Treaty
which pledged signatories to “ever closer Union”. But it was seriously
intended. Some Labour figures remembered the 1962 warning from Hugh Gaitskell
to consider membership very carefully:
It does mean, if this
is the idea, the end of Britain
as an independent European state...it means the end of a thousand years of
history.
Heath
ploughed on regardless and his policy enjoyed widespread support; but the UK
electorate had not debated these issues at all deeply.
The EEC
did not provide Britain with the economic stimulus it needed. There were
quarrels about the level of farming subsidies, the sharing of fisheries; the
long-trusted trade links between the UK, Australia and New Zealand were
abruptly broken. Trade with the EEC grew but Britain remained the sick man of
Europe. Margaret Thatcher presided for 11 years over far-reaching reforms of
British institutions and policies and by the mid-1980s the UK’s economic
performance was transformed and has been broadly satisfactory ever since. The
abrasive Thatcher style made the EU more accommodating and gradually barriers
to the single market in services were reduced.
Best of enemies - Jacques Delors and Margaret Thatcher in 1989 |
While
respected UK politicians such as Roy Jenkins played enthusiastic roles in Europe, Eurocrats
like Jacques Delors (10 years President of the Commission) pressed on with an
integrationist agenda and John Major struggled to convince his party that this
was an appropriate direction of travel. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty formally
created the European Union and set out a programme for the introduction of the
Euro, the common currency. The UK had joined the ERM but speculation against
the pound forced her out on Black
Wednesday, a heavy political setback for the Tories but the start of a
strong economic recovery. Many Tories swore never again to join a European currency
project. Would Thatcher have signed the Maastricht Treaty? Her political
secretary, Charles Powell, says yes, but Bill Cash, arch-Eurosceptic MP
recently produced a 2002 letter from Maggie declaring she never would have done
so.
Whatever,
the British tide of disillusion with Europe quickly rose and the uneasy
relationship worsened as the economic crisis took hold in 2008. The Euro had
been introduced to 18 countries, with Britain declining to participate: its
central bank and the EU Commission handled the crisis badly and the dominant
economy within the zone, Germany, came to exercise a hegemonic control. This
offended many other nationalities in the EU – the Common Market had been
founded precisely to avoid such an eventuality. The EU record on Greece, on
migration and on combatting terrorism gives no confidence and its undemocratic
ways are actually frightening.
In the
hope of lancing the boil of discontent with Europe, David Cameron had promised a
referendum after a renegotiation aimed at liberalising the EU. The
renegotiation failed to elicit any substantial change and the Tory Party in
Parliament is evenly split between the Leavers and the Remainers, the Party in
the country probably favouring Brexit. Labour are mainly Remainers if they tow
the party line, but Corbyn is not an effective leader. Nigel Farage will try to
re-mobilise the 3m UKIP voters, strongly in favour of Brexit while the SNP
promise Scotland will vote to stay.
Boris and David slug it out |
The
campaign so far has been uninspiring. Many an assertion and counter-assertion
but no very convincing economic analysis, only arid lists of business
signatories for In or Out. A rather crude Project Fear from the Remainers has
exaggerated the dangers of exit, the threats to security, the unemployment
level and the dire fate of sterling. We await some solid sense from cerebral
wallflower Michael Gove and some passion from bland David Cameron. Boris
Johnson is an excellent comic turn (a cut above Donald Trump) but his national
leadership credentials are not obvious. His bumbling, contradictory
pronouncements are not a boon to clarity but maybe it will all get better as 23
June comes nearer.
I think
Britain does not remotely fit into the EU as it has evolved. I am fortified in
my Brexit views by the belief that my political mentors, Gaitskell and Thatcher,
would approve. We shall prosper and can only live within the kind of society we
want, if we now vote Leave.
SMD
27.03.16
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Copyright © Sidney Donald 2016