BREXIT - PAST AND PRESENT CONFUSIONS

To say that British attitudes to Europe have been exceedingly ambivalent is almost to understate the case. A profound hope that Europe would succeed and that continental Europe would unify were mixed with scepticism that historic divisions could be surmounted and cynicism that political morality could be sustained. Yet the economic success of the EEC galvanised underperforming Britain to apply for membership, achieved in 1973 after two French vetoes. Relations with Europe have often been fractious and the impetus towards EU centralisation has hit many sensitive nerves; the introduction of the Euro, which Britain declined to join, has added a layer of complication. 

It is natural that we should examine our origins in Europe and learn lessons from our erstwhile leaders. Winston Churchill, in a memorable and moving speech in Zurich in 1946, proposed the Council of Europe, actually formed in 1949, as a prelude to the move towards “a kind of United States of Europe” and encouraged reconciliation between France and Germany.

Churchill advocates European unity

It never occurred to Churchill that Britain herself should join in this enterprise. Britain had her large Commonwealth and an intense national post-war pride; he viewed Britain as a great power acting in cooperation with the USA and the USSR. He was personally sponsoring (while in opposition) the recovery of prostrate Europe, mobilising his unique prestige, to inject some new vision into France and Germany, ruined and humiliated by their wartime activities. Back in office in 1951, the conservatives maintained a friendly but remote relationship with Europe, sending only a low-level delegation as observers to the crucial Messina conference in 1955 which led to the 1957 Treaty of Rome, creating the 6-nation Common Market. Anthony Eden was very doubtful about its future success while Labour’s Clem Attlee was gruffly dismissive. Know them all well. Very recently this country spent a great deal of blood & treasure rescuing four of ’em from attacks by the other two…..!

Britain’s faltering economic performance in the 1950s and 1960s, the Suez debacle and the disintegration of the solidarity of the Commonwealth, convinced Harold Macmillan and officialdom that the only solution was for Britain to apply for membership of the EEC. He was frustrated by a de Gaulle veto in 1963, repeated to the Harold Wilson ministry in 1967. De Gaulle was partly animated by a dislike of “Anglo-Saxon” influences, but he was acutely aware of how different Britain was from continental Europe. His analysis rings true today:

 England in effect is insular, she is maritime, she is linked through her exchanges, her markets, her supply lines to the most diverse and often the most distant countries; she pursues essentially industrial and commercial activities, and only slight agricultural ones. She has in all her doings very marked and very original habits and traditions.

MacMillan was an unusually radical Tory (more accurately a Whig) and although he failed in Europe, his lieutenant and eventual successor Edward Heath completed successful accession negotiations in 1973, once de Gaulle gave way to Pompidou. Heath was a moderniser and a managerial type who saw the Treaty as essentially a trade agreement; he had no time for historic legacy (expressed by dissenters like Enoch Powell) and he dismissed as airy rhetoric the preamble to the Treaty which pledged signatories to “ever closer Union”. But it was seriously intended. Some Labour figures remembered the 1962 warning from Hugh Gaitskell to consider membership very carefully:

It does mean, if this is the idea, the end of Britain as an independent European state...it means the end of a thousand years of history.

Heath ploughed on regardless and his policy enjoyed widespread support; but the UK electorate had not debated these issues at all deeply.

The EEC did not provide Britain with the economic stimulus it needed. There were quarrels about the level of farming subsidies, the sharing of fisheries; the long-trusted trade links between the UK, Australia and New Zealand were abruptly broken. Trade with the EEC grew but Britain remained the sick man of Europe. Margaret Thatcher presided for 11 years over far-reaching reforms of British institutions and policies and by the mid-1980s the UK’s economic performance was transformed and has been broadly satisfactory ever since. The abrasive Thatcher style made the EU more accommodating and gradually barriers to the single market in services were reduced.

Best of enemies - Jacques Delors and Margaret Thatcher in 1989

While respected UK politicians such as Roy Jenkins played enthusiastic roles in Europe, Eurocrats like Jacques Delors (10 years President of the Commission) pressed on with an integrationist agenda and John Major struggled to convince his party that this was an appropriate direction of travel. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty formally created the European Union and set out a programme for the introduction of the Euro, the common currency. The UK had joined the ERM but speculation against the pound forced her out on Black Wednesday, a heavy political setback for the Tories but the start of a strong economic recovery. Many Tories swore never again to join a European currency project. Would Thatcher have signed the Maastricht Treaty? Her political secretary, Charles Powell, says yes, but Bill Cash, arch-Eurosceptic MP recently produced a 2002 letter from Maggie declaring she never would have done so.

Whatever, the British tide of disillusion with Europe quickly rose and the uneasy relationship worsened as the economic crisis took hold in 2008. The Euro had been introduced to 18 countries, with Britain declining to participate: its central bank and the EU Commission handled the crisis badly and the dominant economy within the zone, Germany, came to exercise a hegemonic control. This offended many other nationalities in the EU – the Common Market had been founded precisely to avoid such an eventuality. The EU record on Greece, on migration and on combatting terrorism gives no confidence and its undemocratic ways are actually frightening.

In the hope of lancing the boil of discontent with Europe, David Cameron had promised a referendum after a renegotiation aimed at liberalising the EU. The renegotiation failed to elicit any substantial change and the Tory Party in Parliament is evenly split between the Leavers and the Remainers, the Party in the country probably favouring Brexit. Labour are mainly Remainers if they tow the party line, but Corbyn is not an effective leader. Nigel Farage will try to re-mobilise the 3m UKIP voters, strongly in favour of Brexit while the SNP promise Scotland will vote to stay.

Boris and David slug it out

The campaign so far has been uninspiring. Many an assertion and counter-assertion but no very convincing economic analysis, only arid lists of business signatories for In or Out. A rather crude Project Fear from the Remainers has exaggerated the dangers of exit, the threats to security, the unemployment level and the dire fate of sterling. We await some solid sense from cerebral wallflower Michael Gove and some passion from bland David Cameron. Boris Johnson is an excellent comic turn (a cut above Donald Trump) but his national leadership credentials are not obvious. His bumbling, contradictory pronouncements are not a boon to clarity but maybe it will all get better as 23 June comes nearer.

I think Britain does not remotely fit into the EU as it has evolved. I am fortified in my Brexit views by the belief that my political mentors, Gaitskell and Thatcher, would approve. We shall prosper and can only live within the kind of society we want, if we now vote Leave.

SMD

27.03.16

Text Copyright © Sidney Donald 2016